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- The Situation Room - August 20th
The Situation Room - August 20th
Good morning everyone,
I’m Daniel, and welcome to The Situation Room! We cover the most high impact geopolitical developments every Wednesday!
Today’s topics:
What Could Article 5-Like Guarantees Look Like For Ukraine?
Kim Jong Un Slams South Korea-US drills, Calls For Nuclear Weapon Development Acceleration
Maduro: Mobilizing Millions Of Militia After US 'Threats'
What Could Article 5-Like Guarantees Look Like For Ukraine?

Trump and Zelensky at the White House on Monday, August 18th (Getty Images)
By: Atlas
The ongoing diplomatic push for Ukraine conflict resolution has led to the discussion of "Article 5-like" security guarantees as an alternative to NATO membership and previous failed security assurances. The guarantees would form a special international agreement which would prevent future Russian aggression while staying within Moscow's limits regarding NATO membership expansion.
These guarantees exist because Ukraine cannot join NATO as a full member due to various obstacles. Strong opposition from Russia, ongoing military conflict, and reluctance from some Western nations mean that traditional NATO Article 5 protection—which considers an attack on one member an attack on all—is not currently feasible for Ukraine. The urgent need for dependable security solutions has driven innovative methods to create new frameworks which would establish powerful deterrent systems.
Bitter security experiences of Ukraine demonstrate why enforceable guarantees need to be established. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum failed to protect Ukraine after Russia broke its security "assurances" by annexing Crimea in 2014 and launching a full-scale invasion in 2022. This historical failure has created deep skepticism in Kyiv about any arrangement that falls short of ironclad protection, making the design of new guarantees particularly challenging.
The proposed Article 5-like framework would likely involve a "coalition of the willing" comprising the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, and other key allies. The guarantees would differ from NATO's collective defense mechanism because they would be established through a multilateral security pact that addresses Ukraine's particular situation. The success of such an arrangement would depend entirely on the legal fine print—specific trigger events, response timeframes, and the types of actions required from participating nations.
European leaders have indicated that Europe would serve as the "first line of defense" under such an agreement, with measured US backing but potentially not American boots on the ground. The strategy aims to resolve both Russian fears about direct US military action and American public opposition to automatic military escalation. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared that Ukraine needs to develop into a "steel porcupine" which would be impossible for invaders to consume.
Potential Logistics
The structure of Article 5-like guarantees for Ukraine would need to balance deterrent effectiveness with political feasibility. The military response clauses would be the strongest part of the agreement because they contain direct promises from signatories to use military force to help Ukraine in case of an attack. However, unlike NATO Article 5, these responses might require consensus or expedited approval in national capitals rather than automatic activation, reflecting the realities of operating outside established alliance structures.
Air and naval protection provisions would include agreements to create no-fly zones or maritime exclusion zones in the Black Sea through Western military assets. The plan would use NATO conventional military power to create solid defensive capabilities for Ukraine. The measures would be especially important because Russia has used air and missile strikes extensively throughout the current conflict.
The program requires participating nations to exchange real-time high-level information through early warning systems and intelligence sharing which includes satellite surveillance and cyber-threat data. This would help Ukraine preempt potential attacks while demonstrating Western technological capabilities to potential aggressors. Participating countries would enter legally binding agreements to supply lethal aid and air defense systems and equipment at agreed rates which would prevent the delays and political complications that have sometimes hampered weapons deliveries during the current war.
Most controversial would be provisions for permanent military assistance, including the ongoing deployment of Western trainers, advisors or peacekeepers in Ukraine. Russia has explicitly rejected such arrangements, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stating that Moscow "categorically rejects any scenario that envisages the appearance in Ukraine of a military contingent with the participation of NATO countries." The Russian opposition establishes an essential conflict which makes it difficult to create effective guarantees.
Command and control access would allow Ukraine to join Western military networks for situational awareness and support during crises, while automatic economic and diplomatic sanctions would activate sweeping punitive measures against aggressors based on preset triggers. The proposed elements would establish complete deterrence through military, economic and diplomatic means.
The success of these mechanisms would depend on Western determination to take immediate action when confronted with new aggression. The deterrent power of guarantees becomes less effective when guarantee providers face delays or divisions that could result in the aggressive behavior guarantees seek to stop. The RFERL analysis pointed out that "What matters is not the label but the fine print: who commits to what, how fast and forcefully."
Russian Red Lines
Russia's acceptance of any security guarantee framework for Ukraine would depend on avoiding what Moscow considers unacceptable provocations. The Kremlin has established clear red lines that would determine whether proposed guarantees could form the basis for a negotiated settlement or would instead escalate tensions further.
The Russian government maintains that any formal NATO membership or equivalent alliance structure remains completely unacceptable to them. As Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated, "We cannot allow NATO's military infrastructure to get that close to our borders." Any arrangement that Russia perceives as de facto NATO expansion would likely be treated as grounds for continued or renewed conflict.
The deployment of NATO or Western troops on Ukrainian soil represents another absolute red line for Moscow. Russian officials declared that these forces would be treated as legitimate military targets which would prevent any possibility of peace negotiations as long as foreign troops stay in Ukraine. The constraint restricts the implementation of guarantees which would still allow diplomatic resolution.
The Russian government requires Ukraine to remain neutral through legally enforceable agreements that prohibit Ukraine from joining NATO or any similar military alliances. The Russian government wants Ukraine to limit its military capabilities and exclude Western military bases and command systems from Ukrainian territory. During August 2025 diplomatic contacts, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly agreed in principle to allow some form of NATO-like security guarantee for Ukraine, but with key limitations reflecting these fundamental concerns.
Western policymakers need to develop guarantees which prevent future Russian aggression yet stay away from any provisions that Moscow would view as reasons for war. The risk of excessive ambiguity leads to security assurance failures from the past while excessive automaticity makes peace agreements unattainable. The fine equilibrium between these factors explains why President Trump declared in August 2025 that "We're going to help them, and we're going to make it very secure" while refraining from making particular promises that might create obstacles in the talks.
The ultimate test of any Article 5-like guarantee system will be whether it can provide credible deterrence without formal alliance membership—a challenge that will require unprecedented creativity in international security arrangements.
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