The Situation Room - February 19th

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I’m Trent Barr, and welcome to The Situation Room! We cover the most high impact geopolitical developments every Wednesday!

Today’s topics:

• M23 Rebels Continues to Make Gains in Eastern DRC

• US Gets More Bang For Surveillance Buck

• Syrian Security Forces Arrest Three Suspects in 2013 Tadamon Massacre

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M23 Rebels Continues to Make Gains in Eastern DRC

_{By: By: Maxwell Ingalls, Geopolitical Analyst and Intern for Atlas}

Background

On Sunday, February 16^th it was reported that the March 23^rd Movement (M23) had seized the city of Bukavu, the second largest city in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This follows the fall of Goma to M23 in late January that saw the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) retreat from the city after intense fighting, with thousands of civilians being caught in the crossfire. The M23 was established in 2012 after the demobilization of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), an ethnic Tutsi militant group formed after the end of the Second Congolese War to “defend the Tutsi minority” in the North and South Kivu provinces in the eastern DRC which borders Burundi and Rwanda. The name M23 comes from a peace deal between the CNDP and the DRC on March 23, 2009, which would have seen CNDP fighters integrated into the Congolese military, however former fighters claimed in 2012 that the DRC was not honoring the arrangement which then led to the formation of M23.

Shortly after its formation in 2012, M23 seized Goma which is the largest city in the eastern DRC with over 2 million residents. It took only ten days for the FARDC to retake the city from the M23 who then returned to their base of operations along the border of the DRC and Rwanda. However, the violence did not end with sporadic M23 attacks and offensives from 2012 till the present. Another important facet of the M23 is its true motivation and leadership. It has long been assumed and alleged by international organizations such as the United Nations that Rwanda has not only been the primary backer of M23 but also directly controls it and leads its military operations. Rwanda for its part has played a hand in Congolese affairs since the Second Congolese War from 1996-2003 which claimed over 5 million lives. Rwanda claims its involvement is to protect the Tutsi minority that lives along the border with Rwanda while simultaneously providing security due to the DRCs inability to do so in the Kivu provinces, especially from Hutu rebel groups fighting against Rwanda. However, many outside observers and Congolese citizens see Rwanda’s interference as a justification to extract the DRCs vast untapped natural resources.

Current M23 Offensive

On January 27th, after three days of fighting M23 took control of Goma, the largest city in the eastern DRC. FARDC troops withdrew from the city, with videos circulating of disorganized convoys of vehicles and men fleeing down muddy roads to the west and east of Goma. After initial reports, it was believed there were around 800 people killed in the battle for Goma. However, reports released a week after the battle shows a far more costly engagement with over 3,000 bodies having been found throughout the city. In addition, 15 peacekeepers with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) were killed in fighting in and around Goma. After seizing Goma, the M23 movement released a statement in which they claimed they had no aspirations to attack and seize Bukavu, the provincial capital of the South Kivu province.

On February 9^th the FARDC and M23 announced a ceasefire which put an end to the violence. However, on February 11^th  M23 violated the ceasefire and began taking territory south of Goma toward Bukavu. This contradicts a statement put out by M23 in which they claimed to not have any desire to take Bukavu or territory in South Kivu province after taking Goma. On Sunday, February 16^th , it was reported that M23 had entered Bukavu without any resistance from the FARDC which differs from the FARDC defense of Goma. It would appear that thus far the FARDC has been ineffective at defending against M23 forces, raising major fears about whether it will have the strength and morale to eventually retake Goma and Bukavu. M23 also holds Bukavu’s strategically important airport making it far more difficult for the DRC to fly in reinforcements and equipment to its units in the east of the country. On February 18^th it was reported that the M23 had begun moving south once again along the N5 highway toward the city of Uvira which is situated just across the DRC and Burundi border. Thus far, M23 has been reported to have reached the town of Kamanyola which is located 30 miles to the South of Bukavu. Likewise, sources say Burundi will be withdrawing its contingent of troops in the eastern DRC, who have operated in the eastern part of the country for several years first fighting Burundi militias along the border and then aiding the FARDC against M23. The Burundi defense ministry has dismissed these claims stating that their forces are still carrying out their duties in the DRC. If Burundian troops were to be withdrawn from the country, it will surely make the security situation worse in the area as MONUSCO has also withdrawn its troops from South Kivu. This leaves just the FARDC to defend against the heavily armed and well trained M23.

The Rwanda Factor

Most likely the most important factor in the current conflict is Rwanda. Rwanda has played a role in Congolese affairs since the Second Congolese War. Rwanda has said for decades that its only goal is to protect the Congolese Tutsi population that lives along the border with Rwanda in the DRC from Hutu militants, many of which participated in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. Although to an extent this is true, most observers and international organizations view Rwanda’s role as economic as the DRC has nearly $24 trillion worth of untapped natural resources. Many of these resources such as Cobalt and Tantalum are used to make technologies around the world like smartphones, laptops, batteries, etc. and are the leading exports of the DRC. M23 and its sponsor Rwanda gain a great deal financially from the fighting with the M23 making over $800,000 a month by taxing mines they control in the eastern DRC. One key area recently captured by M23 was Rubaya, where much of the countries cobalt mines can be found. In a report released by the UN it was stated that without 3,000-4,000 Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) soldiers the M23 offensive in the region would have been impossible showing just how much Rwanda is truly involved with M23. This is an accusation Rwanda has consistently denied since M23s founding in 2012 though it would seem that more and more evidence shows otherwise. 

Future of the Conflict

Thus far, the only ceasefire held for two days before M23 began pushing toward Bukavu. The European Union, African Union, and individual states haves called for an end to the violence with many in the EU wanting to suspend an agreement with Rwanda signed in 2024, with Rwanda receiving 750 million pounds to further develop its mineral extraction and healthcare. This agreement was heavily criticized by the DRC with President Félix Tshisekedi saying the agreement was, “a provocation in very bad taste”, as they believe it is a major driver for Rwandan resource exploitation in the eastern DRC. Adding to the millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Kivu provinces, it is believed that nearly 110,000 people fled refugee centers and camps in and around Goma and over 15,000 have fled to neighboring Burundi. As M23 is now pushing toward a third major city in the eastern DRC there it is now up to the international community to stop the fighting. Although the DRC had asked that MONUSCO wind down its operations, Kinshasa may be reconsidering this decision as the of the FARDCs defense has largely failed; drawing into question the FARDCs ability to retake Bukavu and Goma like they did in 2012. In addition, the EU must reconsider its mineral extraction agreement with Rwanda, as it provides a major incentive for Rwanda’s expansion into the DRCs natural resources.

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