The Situation Room - January 1st

Good Morning Everyone & Happy New Year!

Editors Note: I couldn’t be more excited to dig into 2025 with you all on board! The team and I are looking forward to bringing you the same quality of journalism heading into the new year. Thank you for your continued support of our mission, and happy new year!

Welcome to The Situation Room. 2025 is not letting down on eventful stories. A brewing civil war in Myanmar, suspected Russian sabotage in Finland, and a drug bust in South America all get broken down in this week’s review.

Let’s dive in!

  • Myanmar Civil War Heats Up

  • Russian Tanker Held In Finland Over Suspected Sabotage

  • A Major Drug Bust Comes In Columbia

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Civil War in Myanmar Intensifies

Arakan Army photo (Credit: Stimson Center)

By: Maxwell Ingalls, Geopolitical Analyst & Intern for Atlas

Background

Myanmar, or Burma, is a country located in Southeast Asia, bordering China, Thailand, and Laos to the east and Bangladesh, India, and the Bay of Bengal to the west. In World War 2 Myanmar was a strategic front in the war against the Imperial Japanese Army, with the various ethnicities that call Burma home aiding Allied forces. Since independence from the British Crown in 1948, Myanmar has been in a perpetual state of war. This is due to various factors such as ethnic and religious tensions between the ethnically Burmese dominated government and various Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). From 1962 until 2011, Myanmar was ruled by a military junta that heavily cracked down on all dissent; especially against EAOs wishing for greater autonomy or independence from a government that had provided little in terms of the most basic functions and services. In 2015 it seemed that war would finally come to an end in Myanmar when the NLD (National League for Democracy) won the majority of seats in government. Although issues existed between the government and EAOs leading to continuous clashes and even a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Muslim Rohingya people in Rakhine state carried out by the NLD led government, according to the United Nations. Despite this, the NLD overwhelmingly won the 2020 general election. Supporters of the military claimed there was vast election interference without providing evidence. Furthermore, it was reported that the military (called the Tatmadaw) had paid people to protest against the NLD victory.

 On February 1, 2021 the Tatmadaw launched a coup, forcing the NLD to form a government in exile known as the National Unity Government (NUG). Since the coup several unseen alliances have formed between EAOs and the ethnic Burmese population who also took up arms against the junta, creating People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), fomenting into a civil war between the junta and allied militias against various EAOs and PDFs. In recent weeks an EAO fighting in Rakhine state (bordering Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal) called the Arakan Army (AA) has seen massive gains, taking the last junta-controlled post on the border with Bangladesh. As the junta now only controls three towns in Rakhine state, it would seem that it will be the first to fully fall to the rebels. This however leads to pressing questions on the civil war as a whole such as whether the AA will continue to help other groups against the junta and Tatmadaw, or whether they will cease fighting and focus on administering their newly captured territory. Similarly, questions abound on what the future holds for the Rohingya people, as the AA themselves have committed atrocities against the minority groups.

 The Actors

The conflict in Myanmar can be hard to grasp as there are dozens of varying non-state actors, some of which are cordial with each other, and others not so much. In Rakhine state there are three primary groupings. On one side is the Tatmadaw, which as it stands only has full control over three townships in Rakhine state: Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Munaung located on the western coast of the Rakhine. The junta also still holds partial control of Gwa in the far south of the state but is losing combat posts daily to the AA. The second actor is the Arakan Army, an EAO that is religiously Buddhist and was founded in 2009. It is by far the strongest and best equipped non-state actor and has been the primary fighting force against the Tatmadaw in the region, although it has been reported that they’ve lost hundreds of fighters in various battles. The Arakan Army also operates in different regions of the country as they are a part of the Three-Brotherhood Alliance with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in the northeast of Myanmar; most notably carrying out the successful Operation 1027 in October of 2023. The Arakan Army’s main force operates in Rakhine, the homeland of the Arakan people, and are believed to have around 30,000 fighters and advocates for a confederalist system in Myanmar.

The third and final actor is the Rohingya - a Muslim minority that has long faced oppression and ethnic cleansing under both Junta control and when the NLD was in power. In fact, the NLD led government was responsible for the 2017 “clearance operation” in Rakhine due to attacks committed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) against the primarily Buddhist population in Rakhine. During the operation over 645,000 Rohingya civilians were forced to flee their homes and country to refugee camps just across the border in Bangladesh. Another 90,000+ were internally displaced and several thousand were killed. Furthermore, in response to ARSA sectarian attacks, the primarily Buddhist Burmese military and population of Rakhine state began committing large-scale sectarian atrocities against Rohingya citizens. In one instance, hundreds of Rohingya civilians in the village of Tula Toli were raped and killed by the Burmese military and its allied Rakhine militias; including children. In addition, widespread arson was and is a tool used by both the military and the AA to ethnically cleanse villages and towns of their Rohingya populations. Further escalating sectarian violence and mistrust between the Muslim and Buddhist populations in Rakhine the government began to forcibly conscript Muslim men into the military largely from IDP camps to make up for desertion and losses.

Recent AA Gains

Since the beginning of December, the Arakan Army has seized large swathes of territory in Rakhine after the capture of three townships: Ann, Maungdaw, and Taungup. The Battle of Ann lasted from October until December 20th, several battalions of Tatmadaw troops being killed or captured by the AA despite consistent airstrikes by the Tatmadaw’s air force. Ann township was possibly the most strategic town remaining in the hands of the Junta as it hosted the Western Command headquarters, the largest Tatmadaw base in the state of Rakhine. In the attack several high ranking military officers and generals were seized, crippling the Tatmadaw’s ability to control the northern half of Rakhine state. One of the captured, Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Than, has since called on all junta forces left in Rakhine to surrender. This is a major statement considering Kyaw Kyaw Than was the Chief of Staff for Ann township. In a similar operation the AA also took Taungup township on December 15th, seizing the Tatmadaw’s No. 5 Military Operations Command. Using a similar tactic the junta conducted indiscriminate air and artillery strikes destroying much of the town of Taungup. It is reported that fighting has intensified on the road towards the coastal city of Sittwe which is the last major town controlled by the junta in northern Rakhine. AA mortar fire and Tatmadaw airstrikes were reported in several villages surrounding Sittwe but have yet to reach the city. The Tatmadaw has begun defensive preparations of the city and reinforced their positions with what little men and equipment remains indicating that they will most likely fight rather than surrender. As the AA advance is anticipated to begin, thousands of civilians are attempting to flee the area to either AA held regions or to cities in the heart of junta control, such as Yangon, in order to avoid being caught in the crossfire.

Future

It seems almost certain that Rakhine state will fall to the Arakan Army in 2025, it is just a matter of when that will occur. It has been reported that due to the systemic forced conscription of minorities, lack of supplies, food, water, and medical supplies have led to hundreds of Tatmadaw soldiers either deserting or surrendering to the AA. Similarly, the AA has shown that they have the strength and strategic initiative to maintain a multi-front offensive against several battalions’ worth of troops across Rakhine. This is in contrast to the Tatmadaw that is now strictly on the defensive, concentrating its remaining forces in major towns and villages in the last three townships of Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Munaung. The larger question is what will happen after the AA fulfills their goal of controlling Rakhine. In the past, many EAOs have signed ceasefires and agreements with successive governments after achieving some level of autonomy - such as their own parallel governmental structure or more representation in the junta’s government. If this were to happen the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA) could see a major blow to its structure, especially in Chin state. Finally, the question remains on what will happen to the Rohingya population and not just those that remain in Rakhine but also the roughly one million that are living in refugee camps in Bangladesh that wish to return home. As the AA is notorious, like the Tatmadaw junta, for committing ethnic cleansing and forced displacement of Muslim civilians.

Finland Captures Russian Tanker Due to Sabotage Fears

Finnish Coast Guard pictured Dec.26th 2024 (Rajavartiosto-Finnish Border Guard/Lehtikuva/Handout via Reuters)

By: Ciaran Brownlee, Geopolitical Analyst & Intern for Atlas

In an escalation of Baltic Sea tensions, Finnish authorities seized the Eagle S, a Cook Islands-registered tanker suspected of deliberately damaging crucial undersea infrastructure between Finland and Estonia. The incident began on December 25, 2024, when the Estlink 2 subsea electricity cable suffered damage in the Gulf of Finland, triggering an immediate investigation that would reveal a far more extensive pattern of destruction.

Shadow Fleet Operations

The seized vessel, believed to be part of Russia's notorious "shadow fleet" of aging tankers used to evade sanctions on Russian oil sales, was carrying sophisticated surveillance equipment unusual for a commercial vessel. According to Lloyds List, the Eagle S had effectively been operating as a "spy ship" for Russia, monitoring naval activity in the strategic Baltic region. Finnish authorities' swift action in boarding and seizing the vessel on December 26 revealed a complex web of connections and suspicious activities.

Scale of Destruction

The damage caused by the Eagle S extends beyond the initial power cable disruption. Finnish investigators have discovered tracks "dozens of kilometres in length" where they believe the tanker deliberately dragged its anchor across the seabed, damaging not only the Estlink 2 but also four critical internet cables. Two fiber-optic cables owned by Finnish operator Elisa, a third link owned by China's Citic, and a fourth cable running between Finland and Germany owned by Finnish group Cinia all suffered damage or complete severance.

The 658-megawatt Estlink 2 outage has left only the smaller 358-megawatt Estlink 1 operational between Finland and Estonia, raising concerns about power supply stability during the winter months. According to grid operator Fingrid, repairs to the 170-kilometer interconnector will take months to complete.

International Response

The incident has prompted swift diplomatic reactions and security measures. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte expressed readiness to support investigations, while the European Union strongly condemned the destruction of continental infrastructure. Twelve Western nations had already agreed on measures earlier in December to disrupt Russia's shadow fleet operations, making this incident particularly significant in the context of broader international efforts to enforce sanctions against Russia.

Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna emphasized the systematic nature of these incidents, stating that damage to subsea installations in the Baltic Sea has become too frequent to be dismissed as mere accidents or poor seamanship. This event follows a string of similar incidents since 2022, including damage to the Nord Stream gas pipelines and recent disruptions to submarine telecommunication cables in November involving the Chinese cargo ship Yi Peng 3.

Looking Ahead

The seizure of the Eagle S marks a defining escalation in the ongoing efforts to protect infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region. Finnish President Alexander Stubb highlighted the urgent need to address risks posed by Russia's shadow fleet, while Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys called for NATO and the European Union to enhance protection of undersea infrastructure.

Major Drug Bust in Columbia

Colombian military pictured in 2021. (Photo: Colombian Ministry of Defense)

By: Trent Barr, Staff Writer for Atlas

Colombian authorities seized a major drug production lab operated by the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, on Saturday amid increasing military operations against armed groups in Colombia and rising tensions between the Colombian government and the AGC.

Continued Operations

The drug lab held both ingredients for the production of cocaine as well as marijuana and is believed to have been able to produce two tons of cocaine per month, resulting in a profit of 800 million Colombian pesos ($181,510 USD). At the time of the bust, 85 kilograms of cocaine were held in the drug lab while 528 gallons of ingredients for the production of cocaine were seized. This follows another major drug bust by Colombian authorities, who just a day prior seized ingredients for cocaine alongside 800 kilos of the drug valued at 45 million pesos ($10,211 USD).

Drug production facilities are a vital source of income for armed groups active across Colombia, with profits gained through the production and trafficking of narcotics directly funding armed groups’ active conflict with the Colombian government at the expense of both civilians in the region and the environment. The production of narcotics, especially cocaine, remains a critical issue within Colombia as cocaine production has continued to increase through the years. The cultivation of coca, the prime ingredient for cocaine, has historically led to widespread deforestation and soil degradation as those seeking to cultivate the plant illegally clear land in order to set up clandestine coca plantations in the Colombian jungle. According to the National Committee of The Netherlands, over 50,000 hectares (approximately 123,553 acres) of forest were cleared throughout 2020, contributing a staggering 7.54% of national deforestation in Colombia.

The seizure of the drug lab run by the AGC is part of increasing military operations and rising tensions between the armed group and the Colombian government. A number of Colombian soldiers have been reported as casualties by the Colombian Ministry of Defense. In one incident, a Colombian soldier identified as Ronald Jaramillo Mendoza was killed during an engagement with the AGC in Ituango, Antioquia. During this engagement, the alleged leader of the armed group’s presence in the region, identified by the alias “Maicol,” was “neutralized” by authorities while war materiel and communications equipment were seized.

The loss of Mendoza, alongside the neutralization of Maicol, followed the arrest of another key figure within the AGC in early December. The arrested individual, a former colonel of the Colombian army, José Alejandro Castro Cadavid, allegedly conspired with the AGC to assassinate a prominent human rights activist and vocal critic of Clan del Golfo known by the name of Narciso Beleño, who was active in the south of Colombia’s Bolívar department. Beleño had previously reported on alleged attacks by the armed group, which included home invasions and kidnappings, among other violent acts, likely provoking the attack that ultimately took his life. 

In response to Beleño’s efforts, Clan del Golfo threatened the activist and president of the Federation of Agro-Miners of Southern Bolívar (Fedeagromisbol) but refused to cease his reporting on the alleged crimes of the AGC.

Engagements with armed groups in Colombia have been on the rise since the breakdown of multiple ceasefires with active groups and the Colombian government. In March, a ceasefire between the government and a splinter faction of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia known as the Estado Mayor Central (FARC-EMC) broke down following an attack on an indigenous community. A similar ceasefire with the National Liberation Army (ELN) expired following the armed group leaving the peace process after the Colombian government engaged in separate peace talks with the group’s Nariño front, a decision the government representatives have stated was due to lack of progress between the government and the group’s representatives.

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